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Abstract
Communicative listener feedback is a pre-
valent coordination mechanism in dialogue.
Listeners use feedback to provide evidence
of understanding to speakers, who, in turn,
use it to reason about the listeners’ mental
state of listening, determine the grounded-
ness of communicated information, and ad-
apt their subsequent utterances to the listen-
ers’ needs. We describe a speaker-centric
Bayesian model of listeners and their feed-
back behaviour, which can interpret the
listener’s feedback signal in its dialogue con-
text and reason about the listener’s mental
state as well as the grounding status of ob-
jects in information state.
1 Introduction
In dialogue, the interlocutor not currently holding
a turn, is usually not truly passive when listen-
ing to what the turn-holding interlocutor is saying.
Quite the contrary, ‘listeners’ actively participate
in the dialogue. They do so by providing commu-
nicative feedback, which, among other signals, is
evidence of their perception, understanding and
acceptance of and agreement to the speakers’ ut-
terances. ‘Speakers’ use this evidence to reason
about common ground and to design their utter-
ances to accommodate the listener’s needs. This
interplay makes communicative listener feedback
an important mechanism for dialogue coordination
and critical to dialogue success.
From a theoretical perspective, however, the in-
terpretation of communicative feedback is a diffi-
cult problem. Feedback signals are only conven-
tionalised to a certain degree (meaning and use
might vary with the individual listener) and, as
Allwood et al. (1992) argue, they are highly sensit-
ive to their linguistic context – e.g., the speakers’
utterances – and the communicative situation in
general.
We present a Bayesian network model for inter-
preting a listener’s feedback signals in their dia-
logue context. Taking a speaker-centric perspect-
ive, the model keeps representations of the men-
tal ‘state of listening’ attributed to the listener in
the form of belief states over random variables,
as well as an estimation of groundedness of the
information in the speaker’s utterance. To reason
about these representations, the model relates the
listener’s feedback signal to the speaker’s utter-
ance and his expectations of the listener’s reaction
to it.
2 Background and related work
Feedback signals, verbal-vocal or non-verbal, are
communicative acts1 that bear meaning and serve
communicative functions. Allwood et al. (1992,
p. 3) identified four basic communicative functions
of feedback, namely contact (being “willing and
able to continue the interaction”), perception (be-
ing “willing and able to perceive the message”), un-
derstanding (being “willing and able to understand
the message”), and attitudinal reactions (being
“willing and able to react and (adequately) respond
to the message”). It is also argued that these func-
tions form a hierarchy such that higher functions
encompass lower ones (e.g., communicating under-
standing implies perception, which implies being
in contact). Kopp et al. (2008) extended this set of
basic functions by adding acceptance/agreement
(previously considered an attitudinal reaction) and
1Note, however, that listeners might not be (fully) aware
of some of the feedback they are producing. Not all should
be considered as necessarily having communicative intent
(Allwood et al., 1992). Nevertheless, even such ‘indicated’
feedback is communicative and is often interpreted by inter-
locutors.
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by regarding expressions of emotion as attitudinal
reactions
Feedback signals can likely take an infinite num-
ber of forms. Although verbal-vocal feedback sig-
nals, as one example, are taken from a rather small
repertoire of lexical items such as ‘yes’, ‘no’, as
well as non-lexical vocalisations such as ‘uh-huh’,
‘huh’, ‘oh’, ‘mm’, many variations can be produced
spontaneously through generative processes such
as by combination of different vocalisations or re-
peating syllables (Ward, 2006). In addition, these
verbalisations can be subject to significant pros-
odic variation. Naturally, this continuous space
of possible feedback signals can express much
more than the basic functions described above.
And listeners make use of these possibilities to ex-
press subtle differences in meaning (Ehlich, 1986)
– which speakers are able to recognise, interpret
(Stocksmeier et al., 2007; Pammi, 2011) and react
to (Clark and Krych, 2004).
For a computational model of feedback produc-
tion, Kopp et al. (2008) proposed a simple concept
termed ‘listener state.’ It represents a listener’s
current mental state of contact, perception, under-
standing, acceptance and agreement as simple nu-
merical values. The fundamental idea of this model
is that the communicative function of a feedback
signal encodes the listener’s current mental state.
An appropriate expression of this function can be
retrieved by mapping the listener state onto the
continuous space of feedback signals.
In previous work (Buschmeier and Kopp, 2011),
we adopted the concept of listener state as a repres-
entation of a mental state that speakers in dialogue
attribute to listeners through Theory of Mind. That
is, we made it the result of a feedback interpret-
ation process. We argued that such an ‘attributed
listener state’ (ALS) is an important prerequisite
to designing utterances to the immediate needs a
listener communicates through feedback. The ALS
captures such needs in an abstract form (e.g., is
there a difficulty in perception or understanding)
by describing them with a small number of vari-
ables, and is in this way similar to the “one-bit,
most minimal partner model” which Galati and
Brennan (2010, p. 47) propose as a representation
suitable for guiding general audience design pro-
cesses in dialogue.
For more specific adaptations, a speaker needs
to consider more detailed information, such as
the grounding status of previous utterances (Clark,
1996). Knowing whether previously conveyed in-
formation can be assumed to be part of the com-
mon ground (or even its degree of groundedness
[Roque and Traum, 2008]) is important in order to
estimate the success of a contribution (and initiate
a repair if necessary) and to produce subsequent ut-
terances that meet a listener’s informational needs.
Analysing an inherently vague phenomenon
such as feedback signals in their dialogue context
is almost only possible in a probabilistic frame-
work. It is difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions
from listener feedback and even human annotators,
not being directly involved in the interaction, have
difficulties consistently annotating feedback sig-
nals in terms of conversational functions (Geertzen
et al., 2008).
A probabilistic framework well suited for reas-
oning about knowledge in an uncertain world is
that offered by Bayesian networks. They represent
knowledge in terms of ‘degrees of belief’, meaning
that they do not hold one definite belief about the
current state of the world, but represent different
possible world states along with their probabilit-
ies of being true. Furthermore, Bayesian networks
make it possible to model the relevant influences
between random variables representing different
aspects of the world in a compact model. This is
why they are potentially well suited for reasoning
about feedback use in dialogue. Using a Bayesian
network, the conditioning influences between dia-
logue context, listener feedback, ALS, as well as
the estimated grounding status of speaker’s utter-
ances can be captured in a unified and well-defined
probabilistic framework.
Representing grounding status not only in de-
grees of groundedness but also in terms of de-
grees of belief, adds a new dimension to the ap-
proach put forth by Roque and Traum (2008). Deal-
ing with uncertainty in the representation of com-
mon ground simplifies the interface to vague in-
formation gained from listener feedback, and re-
moves the need to prematurely commit to a specific
grounding level. This keeps the information status
of an utterance open to change.
Bayesian networks have already been used
to model problems similar to the one in ques-
tion. Paek and Horvitz (2000), for example, use
Bayesian networks to manage the uncertainties,
among other things, in the model of grounding
behaviour in the ‘Quartet’ architecture for spoken
dialogue systems. Rossignol et al. (2010) on the
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other hand created a Bayesian network model of
dialogue system users’ grounding behaviour. There
the Bayesian network simulates consistent user
behaviour which can be used for experimenta-
tion with, and training of, dialogue management
policies. Finally, Stone and Lascarides (2010) pro-
pose to combine Bayesian networks with the logic
based Segmented Discourse Representation The-
ory (SDRT; Asher and Lascarides, 2010) for a the-
ory of grounding in dialogue that is both rational
(in the utility theoretic sense) and coherent (by
assigning discourse relations a prominent role in
making sense of utterances).
3 A Bayesian model of the listener
A speaker’s Bayesian model of a listener should
relate dialogue context, listener feedback, the at-
tributed listener state as well as the grounding
status of the speaker’s utterances to each other.
Constructing such a model either needs corpora
with fine-grained annotations of all these aspects
of dialogue (to ‘learn’ it from data) or detailed
knowledge about the relations (to design it). Apart
from the fact that adequate corpora are practic-
ally non-existent, structure-learning of a Bayesian
network can only infer conditional independence
between variables and not their underlying causal
relations. The top-ranking results of a structure
learning algorithm might therefore differ substan-
tially, resulting in networks that disagree about
influences and causal relationships (Barber, 2012).
For this reason, we take the approach of construct-
ing a Bayesian network by ‘hand’, making – as is
not uncommon in cognitive modelling – informed
decisions based on research findings and intuition.
3.1 Assumed causal structure
When analysing or modelling a phenomenon with
Bayesian networks, it is helpful to think of them as
representing the phenomenon’s underlying causal
structure (Pearl, 2009). Network nodes represent
causes, effects or both, and directed edges between
nodes represent causality. A directed edge from a
node A to a node B, for example, models that A is
a cause for B, and that B is an effect of A. Another
directed edge from B to a third node C, makes B
the cause of C. Being intermediate, it is possible
that B is both an effect (of A) and a cause (ofC).
Figure 1 illustrates the causal structure of
listener feedback in verbal interaction that we as-
sume. In a given situation, a speaker S produces
S L
IS
Utterance
 Expec-
tations
ALS Mental state
Situation
Feedback
IS
Figure 1: Speaker S reasoning about the mental state of
listener L. S’s utterances cause L to move into a certain
state of understanding. This influences L’s feedback
signals, which are evidence for S’s attributed listener
state of L.
an utterance in the presence of a listener L and
wants to know what L’s mental state of listening is
towards her utterance, i.e., whether L is in contact,
has perceived, understood and accepts or agrees
with S’s utterance. As it is impossible for S to dir-
ectly observe L’s mental state, she can only try to
reconstruct it based on L’s communicative actions
(i.e., L’s feedback) and by relating it to the dia-
logue context: her utterance, her expectations and
the communicative situation.
To make a causally coherent argument, we as-
sume, for the moment, that L’s unobservable men-
tal state is part of the Bayesian listener model
(parts unobservable to S are drawn with grey
dashed lines in Figure 1). L’s mental state results
from the effect of S’s utterance, the communicative
situation as well as L’s information state. L’s men-
tal state, on the other hand, causes him to provide
evidence of his understanding by producing a feed-
back signal. In this way closure is achieved for the
causal chain from utterance, via mental state and
feedback signal, to S’s reconstruction ‘ALS’ of L’s
mental state.
This causally coherent model can easily be re-
duced to an agent-centric model for S, which con-
sists of only those influences that S can observe
directly (drawn with black solid lines in Figure 1).
Although this leads to a ‘gap’ in the causal chain,
nodes retain their roles as causes and/or effects.
It should be noted, however, that the causal
model only provides the scaffolding of a more
detailed model to be presented next. Each node is
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a mere place-holder for a complete network struc-
ture. These sub-networks are constructed accord-
ing to information that is available and useful to
model feedback interpretation for a speaker.
3.2 Attributed Listener State
The core of the Bayesian model of the listener is
the reconstruction of the listener’s mental state, the
attributed listener state. As described in Section 2,
the model should give an estimate of whether the
listener is in contact, how well she perceives and
understands what the speaker says and to which
degree the listener accepts and agrees to the utter-
ance’s content. As in previous models of (attrib-
uted) listener state (Kopp et al., 2008; Buschmeier
and Kopp, 2011) the notions of contact, perception,
understanding, acceptance and agreement are mod-
elled with one variable each. Here, their valuesC,
P,U , AC and AG, however, should be interpreted
in terms of ‘degrees of belief’ instead of in terms
of strength (which is modelled in terms of the vari-
ables’ states – see Section 4.1).
The influences among the ALS variables are
modelled after Allwood et al. (1992)’s hierarchy
of feedback functions and Clark (1996)’s ladder of
actions: perception subsumes contact, understand-
ing subsumes perception and contact, acceptance
and agreement subsume understanding perception
and contact. This means, for instance, that if under-
standing is assumed, perception and contact can be
assumed as well. A lack of perception, on the other
hand, usually implies that understanding cannot be
assumed. Thus, the influences are the following:
C influences P, P influencesU , andU influences
AC and AG (see the central part of Figure 2 for a
graphical depiction).
3.3 Contextual influences on ALS
The most important information for inferring the
ALS is the listener’s feedback signal itself. Thus, if
it is recognised as having the communicative func-
tion ‘understanding’, there is a positive influence
on the variables C, P and – especially – U . Vari-
ables AC and AG on the other hand are negatively
influenced since speakers usually signal feedback
of the highest function possible (Allwood et al.,
1992; Clark, 1996).
To take into account the context-sensitivity of
feedback signals, features of the speaker’s utter-
ance need to be considered in ALS estimation as
well. If for example the speaker’s utterance is
simple2, the degree of belief in the listener’s suc-
cessful understanding of the utterance should be
high – even if explicit positive feedback is absent.
A further influence on ALS variables is how cer-
tain the listener seems to be about his mental state.
A feedback signal can imply that a listener is still
in the process of evaluating the speaker’s statement
– and is not yet sure whether she agrees with it –
often by lengthening the signal or being hesitant
of its production (Ward, 2006). This uncertainty
could also influence the ALS.
Finally, situation specific influences and the
influence of a speaker’s expectations about the
listener’s behaviour are often connected to the dia-
logue domain and to known preferences in the
listener. In a calendar assistant domain, which is
the task domain we are working with, when presen-
ted, e.g., with a tight schedule and a new appoint-
ment of low priority, the likelihood is high that a
listener rejects this new appointment.
3.4 Influences on Information State
The ALS mediates between the contextual factors
described above and the information state. This
makes the grounding status of the objects in the
information state conditionally independent of the
multitude of possible influencing factors which
reduces the model’s complexity significantly.
Each of the ALS variables influences the ground-
ing status variable to a different degree. Believing
that the listener is in full contact but neither per-
ceives nor understands what the speaker is saying,
for example, should lead to a low degree of be-
lief in the groundedness of the object. In contrast,
assuming the listener to have at least some under-
standing might be enough to consider information
to be sufficiently grounded.
This part of the model can be considered one ele-
ment of the speaker’s ‘grounding criterion’ (Clark,
1996). The influences between ALS and inform-
ation state map the listener’s mental state (in-
ferred from evidence of understanding) to groun-
dedness of objects in information state. Whether
the amount of groundedness is then considered
‘sufficient for current purposes’ (another element
of the grounding process) is to be determined else-
where.
2The notion of ‘simplicity’ is complex in itself. Here it is
assumed that an utterance is simple if (i) it is not unexpected
by the listener, (ii) it does not contains much new information
and (iii) it is short.
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Figure 2: Structure of the Bayesian model of the listener.
The variables shaded in grey are fully observable to a
speaker (FB function, modality, polarity, and progress
are derived from the listener’s feedback signal).
4 Formal definition
Wewill now present the complete formal definition
of the Bayesian model of the listener3.It consists
of a network structure, the node-internal structure,
including their states, and parameters.
4.1 Model and node-internal structure
Figure 2 shows the structure of the full Bayesian
network model of the listener. It reflects the causal
structure sketched in Section 3.1 and Figure 1,
and shows how the ALS sub-network, described
in Section 3.2, acts as a layer mediating between
context and information state.
Context itself consists of evidence nodes (drawn
in shades of grey in Figure 2) that are directly
observable to a speaker, and nodes for abstract
concepts such as difficulty of the speaker’s utter-
ance, uncertainty of the listener, and the trade-off
that the speaker expects the listener to make.
The node Difficulty reflects properties of the
speaker’s utterance and is part of the dialogue con-
text. As described in footnote 2, it is an abstraction
of utterance Length (having the states short, me-
dium, long), of how Expected the utterance is (low,
medium, high) as well as the Novelty of the in-
formation that is encoded in the utterance (new,
old). Difficulty itself has the states low, medium
and high. It influences the variables P andU in the
ALS.
3A machine readable specification in the standardised ‘Ba-
yesian network interchange format’ (XBIF) is available from
http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.94357 .
The nodes FB-function and Uncertainty reflect
properties of the listener’s feedback signal. It is
assumed that the communicative function of the
listener’s signal is classified externally and then
represented in the node FB-function. This node can
take the states c, p, u, ac, ag, ¬c,¬p,¬u,¬ac,¬ag,
and none, which correspond to the basic functions
as identified by Allwood et al. (1992) and Kopp et
al. (2008). Feedback functions are distinguished
according to their polarity (e.g., understood [u]
versus not-understood [¬u]). If the listener did not
provide feedback, the state none might be chosen.
The variable FB-function directly influences each
of the ALS-variables.
Uncertainty is an abstract concept derived from
the Polarity of the feedback signal (positive, neut-
ral or negative), whether the signal conveys that
the listener is still in Progress evaluating what the
speaker uttered (ongoing, finished), and theModal-
ity used to give feedback (verbal, non-verbal, mul-
timodal). For example, a setting where Polarity is
neutral, only oneModality is used, and Progress
is ongoing, results in a degree of belief where the
listener’s uncertainty is high. The listener’s uncer-
tainty has an influence on the ALS-variables P,U ,
AC and AG.
Trade-off is an example of a domain-specific
node that reflects the speaker’s domain knowledge
and his expectations of the listener’s behaviour
in the calendar assistant domain that we are us-
ing. It should not be considered to be an integral
part of a general model of a listener. The trade-
off a listener is expected to address depends on
how many Constraints, i.e., other appointments a
proposed appointment potentially interferes with
(none, one, a few, many) and the Priority of the new
appointment as compared to the priorities of the
constraining appointments (lower, similar, higher).
Trade-off itself can be low, medium and high and
influences the variables AC and AG in the ALS.
Each of the ALS variables has the three states
low, medium, and high. The variable Ground-
ing with five states low, low-medium, medium,
medium-high and high is more fine-grained and
reflects a simple model of degrees of grounding
(Roque and Traum, 2008). In general, both the ALS
variables as well as the Grounding variable could
be modelled with higher or lower number of states,
and even as continuous random variables. Table 1
gives an overview of all variables/nodes and their
states.
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Table 1: Variables and their states in the Bayesian model
of the listener. ‘Meta nodes’ correspond to the nodes
described in Section 3.1 and displayed in Figure 1.
Meta nodes Variables States
ALS Contact low, medium, high
Perception low, medium, high
Understanding low, medium, high
ACceptance low, medium, high
AGreement low, medium, high
Utterance Difficulty low, medium, high
–Expectable low, medium, high
–Length short, medium, long
–Novelty new, old
Feedback –FB-function none, c, p, u, ac, ag,
¬c,¬p,¬u,¬ac,¬ag
Uncertainty low, medium, high
–Modality verbal, non-verbal
multimodal
–Progress ongoing, finished
–Polarity negative, neutral,
positive
Expectations Trade-off low, medium, high
–Constraints none, one, a few, many
–Priority lower, similar, higher
Inform. state Grounding low, low-medium,
medium, medium-high,
high
4.2 Model parameters
An important advantage of Bayesian networks over
other probabilistic modelling approaches is that
through the structure of the model (i.e., assuming
conditional independences) a large reduction in
the number of model-parameters is possible. The
structure of our model allows a reduction of the full
joint probability distribution with 1.870.672.320
parameters to a factored distribution consisting of
only of 5.287 parameters.
As estimating this much smaller number of para-
meters by hand is still a tedious and error-prone
task, we generated the model’s parameters from a
‘structured representation’ of the conditional prob-
ability tables cpt(Xa) for each variable/node Xa
and its influencing variables Xi   parents(Xa) =
{Xi, . . .Xi+n} in the following way:
1. Set the strength of influence that each variable
Xi exerts on Xa by defining a weightwi   [0,1]
so that  i+nk=i wk = 1.
2. For each variable Xi and its states xi j  
states(Xi) = {xi1 , . . .xiz} assign a value  xi j  
[ 1,1]. xi j influences Xa negatively if  xi j < 0,
positively if  xi j > 0, and does not have an in-
fluence if  xi j = 0.
3. Now, for each possible combination of
states (xi j , . . . ,xi+n j)   {states(Xi)   . . .  
states(Xi+n)}, calculate its weighted influ-
ence µ(xi j , . . . ,xi+n j) =  i+nk=i wk ·  xk j .
4. For each state xaj   states(Xa) = {xa1 , . . .xaz},
assign a value oxa j   [ 1,1]. Similarly to the
definition given in step 2 above, oxa j determ-
ines the influence each combination c from
step 3 has on a state xaj . A natural assign-
ment for a variable with states low, medium
and high would be Xalow =  1;Xamedium =
0;Xahigh = 1.
5. Now for each entry in the conditional
probability table cpt(Xa) calculate a
preliminary value p˜(xaj |xi j , . . . ,xi+n j) =
N (oxa j ,µ(xi j , . . . ,xi+n j), where
N (oxa j ,µ(xi j , . . . ,xi+n j)) is the value of
the Gaussian probability density function at
oxa j and with mean µ(xi j , . . . ,xi+n j).
6. Finally, normalise cpt(Xa) column-wise to
convert the values p˜(xaj |xi j , . . . ,xi+n j) into
probabilities p(xaj |xi j , . . . ,xi+n j).
In summary, this method generates the condi-
tional probability table for a variable Xa by defin-
ing weighted means for each combination of states
of its influencing variables. These are then used as
means for Gaussian probability density functions,
from each of which values at points oxa j associated
with the states of the variable Xa are calculated.
These are then converted to probabilities and put
in the CPT.
With this method, instead of having to define the
complete CPTs manually, i.e., a number of xCPT =
|states(Xa)| · i+nk=i |states(Xk)| parameters for each
variable, only xSR = |parents(Xa)|+ |states(Xa)|+
 i+nk=i |states(Xk)| parameters are needed to define
this structured representation of a conditional prob-
ability table. The loss of expressiveness caused by
the structured representation was not limiting for
defining the model – on the contrary, with its 254
parameters, it allowed for a straightforward expres-
sion of the relationships between variables.
17
Example 1 – Feedback-function: (a) FB-function = u (b) FB-function = ¬u. Fixed: length = normal, expected = medium,
novelty = new, modality = verbal, progress = finished, polarity = neutral, priority = similar, constraints = one.
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Example 2 – Difficulty: (a) length = long, expected = low, novelty = new (b) length = short, expected = high, novelty = old
Fixed: FB-function = none, polarity = neutral.
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Example 3 – Uncertainty: (a) modality = nonverbal, polarity = neural, progress = ongoing (b) modality = both, polarity = positive,
progress = finished. Fixed: FB-function = ac, length = normal, expected = med, novelty = new, priority = similar, constraints = a few.
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Figure 3: Plots of the belief states for three examples, each in two contrasting conditions. Conditions (a) are
plotted with black, conditions (b) with grey comb lines. The x-axes show the degrees of belief of each variable’s
states. Variables are abbreviated as follows: DIFficulty, UNCertainty, TRade-off, GRounding.C, P,U , AC and AG
are the ALS-variables.
5 Results
With the structure of the model defined, and the
conditional probability tables generated from the
structured representation, we use the Bayesian net-
work and sensitivity analysis program SAMIAM4
(Darwiche, 2009) to illustrate how the model be-
haves in some interesting situations. Figure 3
shows the belief states of the abstract context vari-
ables Difficulty, Uncertainty and Trade-off ; the
ALS-variables C, P, U , AC and AG; as well as
the information state variable Grounding. The be-
lief states are calculated given a certain fixed as-
signment of (some of) the variables representing
the user’s behaviour and the dialogue context. For
each example, two contrasting belief states are dis-
played next to each other (conditions [a] drawn
in black, conditions [b] in grey), reflecting the ef-
fect of a change in some variables while the others
remain fixed.
Example 1, shows the influence a listener’s feed-
back signal, in the form of its feedback function,
has on ALS and grounding. It is assumed that the
speaker will produce an utterance of normal length,
that will not be unexpected, yet still contain new
information. The belief state of the variable Dif-
ficulty (see Figure 3) indicates that this utterance
4http://reasoning.cs.ucla.edu/samiam/
will be of medium to high difficulty to the listener.
It is further assumed that the listener either gives
verbal feedback of function (a) understanding, e.g.,
‘uh-huh’, or (b) non-understanding, e.g., ‘huh’ in
response. The signal also conveys that the listener
finished evaluating the utterance and thus, as the
belief state of the variable Uncertainty indicates,
seems to be rather certain about his evaluation. As
a result, the belief states of all ALS variables show
that feedback of type understanding in contrast to
non-understanding results in a shift of the probabil-
ity mass towardsmedium and high states. Similarly,
for the variable Grounding, a higher degree of be-
lief in groundedness of the utterance’s content can
be observed in the understanding condition (a).
Example 2 varies the difficulty of the speaker’s
utterance from (a) higher difficulty to (b) lower
difficulty. The change in the evidence variables
Length, Expected and Novelty is clearly reflected
in the belief state of the variable Difficulty. It is
assumed that the listener does not provide any feed-
back (i.e., FB-function is none). As a result, the
probability mass in the belief states of the ALS
variables P and U shift towards the medium and
low states for the difficult utterance, and is more
evenly distributed between the medium and high
states for the simpler utterance. The same holds
for the variable Grounding. The degree of belief
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in the utterance being grounded is higher for the
simpler utterance. Notably, the belief states of the
variables C, AC and AG are almost not affected.
Utterance difficulty does not have a large impact
on the listener being in contact, his acceptance of,
or agreement with the utterance.
In Example 3 the listener responds to an utter-
ance about an appointment which overlaps with a
few other appointments (Constraints = a few) all of
similar priority (Priority = similar). In both condi-
tions, the listener communicates acceptance – but
with different levels of uncertainty. In (a) the feed-
back signal is provided non-verbally, with neutral
polarity and an indication that the listener’s evalu-
ation process is still ongoing (e.g., a hesitant and
lengthened ‘okay’). The belief state of the variable
Uncertainty is mostly distributed between medium
and high. In (b) feedback is provided both verbally
and non-verbally, with a positive polarity and evid-
ence that the evaluation is finished (e.g, a head nod
in combination with an acknowledging ‘okay’).
Here the probability mass of Uncertainty is mostly
distributed among the states low and medium. As
a result, the belief states of the ALS variables for
these two conditions differ for the variables P,U ,
AC and for AG (though only slightly). Although
acceptance is communicated in both cases, higher
uncertainty of the listener results in a shift of prob-
ability mass towards medium states instead of me-
dium and high states. This also holds for the degree
of belief in the utterance being grounded.
For each example the influences of variable
changes on the belief states might seem small, but
they might nevertheless make a significant differ-
ence in a decision theoretic process that operates
on these probabilities. It should also be noted that
the communicative situation was never impaired
severely or even approached a breakdown. In gen-
eral, the model parameters were chosen in such
a way that negative feedback is required to make
the low states of the ALS-variables likely, i.e., the
model is optimistic about the listener’s ability and
willingness to perceive, understand, accept, and
agree with what the speaker communicates.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Listener feedback is crucial for speaker–listener
coordination in dialogue as it provides rich and
subtle cues of the listener’s mental state, as well
as of the grounding status of information. We have
presented a Bayesian network model for interpret-
ing listener feedback for exactly these issues. It
is important to note that the details of the model
presented here should be regarded as just one con-
crete instantiation of a Bayesian model of listeners,
and that we certainly did not (nor did we aim to)
integrate everything that could influence the inter-
pretation of feedback.
Nevertheless, our first modelling results reveal a
number of interesting findings. Applying Bayesian
networks enables a specification of the factors that
contribute to the meaning of a feedback signal in a
coherent, well-defined and interpretable formalism.
Using this formalism, our model allows for direct
reasoning about a listener’s mental state, given
certain evidence of perception, understanding, ac-
ceptance and agreement as provided by the listener
in form of feedback, as well as the dialogue con-
text. Built into the formalism is the capability to
use the model diagnostically, i.e., reasoning from
(assumed or asserted) listener states to possible
feedback signals that most probably signal those.
This can, for example, be used by the speaker to
infer what kind of listener feedback would be most
helpful under a particular uncertain dialogue situ-
ation. Having an idea of which kind of feedback is
useful at the moment opens up the opportunity to
produce a specific cue for the listener.
While reasoning about the listener’s mental
state and the groundedness of information, the
model considers dialogue context in the form of a
speaker’s utterance and the speaker’s expectations
of the listener’s reaction to the utterance. How-
ever, this must certainly be extended. For example,
in a referential communication scenario, the situ-
ation could be modelled in terms of visibility and
saliency of referents; in a noisy environment, the
noise level could have an influence on the probabil-
ity of an utterance being perceived and understood.
Dialogue context could also be modelled in more
sophisticated ways, for example by considering
speech acts, and the ambiguity of the speaker’s
utterance.
An advantageous property of the model is its
compatibility with incremental processing of feed-
back and incremental grounding in spoken dia-
logue systems. The model is constructed to run in
parallel to a system’s incremental output genera-
tion and, therefore, can influence the system beha-
viour even while it is being generated and synthes-
ised (Buschmeier et al., 2012). Furthermore, the
model is able to leverage subtle information about
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the listener’s progress in processing the speaker’s
utterance, modulated, e.g., prosodically onto the
feedback signal. It should be noted here, however,
that the model currently does not regard temporal
and discourse relationships – apart from the trivial
relation that an utterance is followed by a feedback
signal – in dialogue. Our plan is to make the model
dynamic, taking influences of dialogue history and
previous listener state on feedback interpretation
into consideration (Stone and Lascarides, 2010).
Finally, using Bayesian networks makes it pos-
sible to adjust parameters to specific needs, even
automatically and incrementally through learning.
As described earlier, feedback signals are only con-
ventionalised to a certain degree. It is likely that
their usage and meaning differs between individual
listeners. Currently, our model does not consider
this, but idiosyncratic feedback meaning of listen-
ers can easily be modelled via the model’s struc-
ture and parameters. This bears the potential to
make listener’s idiosyncrasies ‘transparent’ and
our Bayesian model of a listener can thus serve as
a good starting point for studying the listener spe-
cific semantics and pragmatics of communicative
feedback behaviour.
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